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Abstract: Considering the growing externalisation of strategic activities, the problem of the control of buyer-
supplier relationships is crucial. Therefore, researchers usually propose modes of control that are adapted to 
various  environments.  However,  the  organisations  are  often  considered  as  “black  boxes”  whose  goals  are 
unspecified. This paper examines buyer-supplier control configurations that take into account the organisation 
of buying firms and their goals toward their suppliers. This research is based on six case studies conducted in 
the manufacturing industry (60 interviews). The outcome of the research is a matrix which represents four 
configurations of buyer-supplier control, based on the global purchasing environment of the buying firm (in 
terms  of  reciprocal  dependence  between  the  buyer  and  its  suppliers).  For  each  configuration,  a  type  of 
purchasing organisation (structure and intra-organisational control of purchasing agents) and a principal goal 
for the buying firm are proposed: the lord-buyer wants to exert its power, the partner-buyer aims at assuring 
goal congruence with its suppliers, the vassal-buyer tries to reduce uncertainty and the market-buyer seeks to 
grasp opportunities on the market. For each configuration, the modes of control that the buyer exerts on its 
suppliers –in terms of means, objects of control, influence strategies of the buyer (more or less coercive) and 
suppliers reactions- are coherent with the main goal of the buyer. 
 




Outsourcing is a form of inter-firm relationships that has become a crucial subject of study. In 
many industrial sectors, the economic performance of firms that outsource (here the buyer 
firms) is due, to a large extent, to the suppliers that contribute roughly 80% pf the added value 
of products sold. Moreover, firms are implicated in the long term with suppliers that conceive 
and  realise  their  strategic  components.  As  a  result,  buyer  firms  need  to  manage  their 
relationships and more specifically to organise the control of their suppliers to reach their 
goals. 
 
Research studies on inter-organisational control have proliferated during the last decade. In 
particular, considering the diversity of relationships, authors have developed typologies that 
are adapted to the characteristics of the transactions, environment and parties (Dekker, 2004; 
Dumoulin, 1997; Hakansson and Lind, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). 
Though these works have added the growing knowledge of the design of control systems in 
outsourcing relationships, the authors generally consider the firms as “black boxes” whose 









































Author manuscript, published in "28th EAA Congress, G￶teborg : Sweden (2005)"This  paper  examines  control  in  outsourcing  relationships  and  takes  into  account  the 
organisation of buyer firms and their goals toward their suppliers as well as the modes of 
control  they  exert on  them. We want  to  give some theoretical  and  empirical  evidence to 
answer to the question: Why and how buyers control their suppliers? 
 
This  research  is  based  on  six  case  studies  conducted  in  the  manufacturing  industry.  The 
purchasing  environment  of  theses  firms  is  characterised  by  the  degree  of  reciprocal 
dependence between this firm and its suppliers. The internal purchasing organisation of thses 
firms has been studied (in terms of structure and intra-organisational control of purchasing 
agents) and the control they exert over their suppliers. 
 
This paper is structured in three parts. The first examines the three main views on inter-
organisational control in the literature (transactional, relational and power-dependence views) 
and the conceptual framework of the study. The second is dedicated to the presentation of the 
qualitative methodology. The third presents the four buyer-supplier configurations that have 
been observed: lordship, vassalage, market and partnership.  
 
1. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
1.1. Control in Inter-organisational Literature 
Three  main  views  structure  inter-organisational  control  literature  (Heide,  1994):  the 
Transactional view, the Relational view and the Power and Dependence view. In each of these 
views, theorists propose modes of control that aim to one ore several goals. 
 
1.1.1. Goals and Modes of control in the Transactional View 
The transactional view gathers theorists who analyse exchanges as economic transactions. In 
this view, the transaction cost theory (TCT) developed by Williamson (1985) indicates that 
the characteristics of transactions (uncertainty, frequency, degree of specific assets
i) as well as 
the context in which they occur (small numbers, opportunism and bounded rationality) entail 
transaction costs. TCT proposes three governance structures and contracts to cap transaction 
costs: the market (classical contract), the hierarchy (personalised contract), or the hybrid form 







































0relies on authority (fiat), and the hybrid form relies on long-term contracts. The control modes 
associated with these governance structures aim to gain efficiency, reduce transactional risk 
(Dekker,  2004)  and  protect  against  the  opportunism  of  exchange  partners.  Also  within 
transaction view, agency theory raises the problem of the management of opportunism in the 
context of uncertainty and diverging interests between the parties. Celly and Frazier (1996) 
have tested the propositions of this theory in buyer-supplier relationships. They show that the 
more complex the product of the exchange is, the environment uncertain and the supplier 
difficult to replace, the more the buyer favours control of behaviours rather than control of 
results. 
 
1.1.2. Goals and Modes of Control in the Relational Exchange View  
Scholars of the relational exchange view develop a social conception of exchanges. Based on 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), on Macaulay’s seminal study 
about non-contractual relationships, and on Macneil’s work about the distinction between 
discrete and relational exchange, theorists from the relational view study control mechanisms 
(generally  social  ones)  that  govern  exchanges  and  better  the  efficacy  of  inter-firm 
relationships  (Larson,  1992).  These  mechanisms  develop  according  to  different  phases 
(Dwyer et al., 1987). In the beginning, cooperation only concerns risk-free operations and 
relies on classical contracts. Then, the success of these exchanges encourages the partners to 
engage  in  riskier  operations  and  to  deepen  cooperation.  Repeated  interactions  between 
individuals  lead  to  the  emergence  of  explicit  rules  (communication  procedures,  rules  of 
information  sharing)  and  implicit  rules  (honesty,  openness,  equity,  reciprocity)  that 
consolidate  cooperation  (Larson,  1992).  These  rules  are  actually  relational  norms  that 
structure  exchanges  and  provide  the  required  coordination.  So,  informal  control  that 
progressively replace formal devices (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) are above all a means to 
achieve common goals in the long term. Firms cooperate to achieve mutual gain rather than 
behaving opportunistically to satisfy their individual interest alone. 
 
1.1.3. Goals and Modes of Control in the Power Dependence View  
Considering that firms are dependent on the environment where they find the resources they 
need to achieve their goals, some scholars have applied the concept of dependence developed 







































0exchanges. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have developed the Resource Dependence Theory that 
proposes diverse strategies of adaptation and avoidance given the situations of uncertainty and 
dependence  faced  by  the  organisations.  In  particular,  the  authors  suggest  structuring 
exchanges by establishing formal or semi-formal inter-organisational links such as contracts, 
joint  ventures,  or  mergers  (Ulrich  and  Barney,  1984).  The  response  put  forward  by 
organisations to the problem of uncertainty and dependence is to stretch coordination with the 
appropriate  partners  and  to  create  “negotiated  environments”
1.  Here,  the  organisation’s 
performance is determined by its effectiveness, whereas the transactional view emphasizes 
efficiency. In addition, the scarcity of resources does not encourage organisations to get to 
know each other better or to cooperate in a reciprocal manner, as the relational exchange view 
suggests,  but  to  develop  strategies  of  influence  (or,  on  the  contrary,  strategies  that  limit 
influence) over the organisations that hold the resources (Oliver, 1990). 
Also within the power dependence view, researchers studied the way power may be exerted. 
Following  French  and  Raven  (1959),  Frazier  and  his  colleagues  study  coercive  influence 
strategies –threat, legal argument, promise– and non-coercive influence strategies –request, 
recommendation, exchange of information– that impact actions (Frazier et al., 1989; Frazier 
and Summers, 1986). 
So, in this view, modes of control (e.g. contracts, coercive or non coercive strategies) aim to 
limit the influence of the organisations that hold the critical resources or, in the contrary, to 
exert power on dependent organisations. 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the three theoretical views presented.  
 
                                                            









































Views  Transactional   Relational   Power Dependence  
Unit of analysis  Transaction  Relation  Organisation 
Objectives of the parties  Seek their personal 
economic interest 
Motivation to 
cooperate and share the 
benefits of cooperation 
fairly  
Exposure to the 
demands of those who 
hold resources and to 
their coercive influence 
Postulates on the goal 
congruence between the 
parties 
Interest conflicts 
between the parties 
Goal congruence in the 
long term between the 
parties 
Interest conflicts 
between the parties 
Performance criteria  Efficiency  Developing 
cooperation and its 
benefits in the long 
term shared out 
according to equity 
norms  
Effectiveness 
Control goals  Reducing transactional 
risks; protecting 
against opportunism  
Strengthening 






the partner’s actions  






investments; result or 
behaviour controls 







more or less coercive 
strategies of influence 
Table 1: Inter-organisational Control according to the Principal Theoretical Views 
 
These  different  views  add  to  the  knowledge  of  inter-organisational  control.  We  suggest 
integrating  their  contribution  in  a  conceptual  framework  based  on  organisational  control 
concepts.  
 
1.2. The application of organisational control concepts to inter-organisational control 
1.2.1. Inter-organisational control conception 
Following Flamholtz (1996)’s conception of organisational control, we define the control the 
buyer exerts on its supplier as the process by which the buyer influences the actions of the 







































0process. Each episode of the relationship (for example each transaction) occurs within an 
historical and sociological context (contribution of the relational exchange view). Second, the 
interests of the parties can diverge or converge depending on the situation. Third, control is 
finalised toward the goals of the buyer. We postulate that the buyer knows its goal. Though it 
is not always able to give some precise objectives to its supplier, it can give it a direction. 
Fourth,  control  can  be  exerted  through  formal  and  /  or  informal  mechanisms.  In  inter-
organisational literature, the relation between formal and informal control is much disputed. 
Scholars of the transactional view favour a formal conception of control to fight against the 
opportunism  of  the  partner  and  to  reduce  uncertainty.  On  the  contrary,  theorists  of  the 
relational  exchange  view  suggest  that  trust  and  relational  norms  give  the  required 
coordination  of  exchanges  whereas  formal  control  leads  to  suspicion  (Nooteboom  et  al., 
1997). Some others consider that trust and control are complementary to favour confidence 
(Das and Teng, 1998; Guibert and Dupuy, 1997). We do not favour a priori one or the other 
conception but we will try to observe formal mechanisms as well as informal processes.  
 
Since  the  conception  of  buyer-supplier  control  is  clarified,  we  suggest  to  expose  our 
conceptual framework. 
 
1.2.2. Conceptual framework 
The objective of this research is to study buyer-supplier control configurations that take into 
account  the  organisations  of  the  buyers  and  their  goals.  We  propose  to  structure  our 
conceptual framework in three points: first, the purchasing environment of the buyer; second 
its organisation and third, the control process over the suppliers.  
 
Purchasing environment of the buyer 
The  environment  of  buyer-supplier  relationships  is  often  differentiated  according  to  the 
characteristics of the transactions, the characteristics of the parties or the degree of uncertainty 
(Langfield-Smith  and  Smith,  2003;  van  der  Meer-Kooistra  and  Vosselman,  2000).  In  the 
study, we have not opted for categories a priori to describe the purchasing environment of the 









































Organisation of the buyer 
Two aspects of the organisation will be studied: the structure of the buyer and the intra-
organisational control of the purchasing agents. 
 
The structure can be defined as “a relatively stable allocation of tasks and roles that create a 
pattern of interrelated activities that allow the firm to conduct and coordinate its activities” 
(Desreumaux, 1992, p. 50). The structure explains the architecture of the control the buyer 
exerts over its supplier. In this research, the structural form will be analysed as well as the 
processes of decision making that can be more informal.  
 
The intra-organisational control of the purchasing agents is defined as the process by which 
the buyer organisation influences the actions of its purchasing agents to reach its goals. The 
purchasing agents are key actors of the suppliers control process since their role is to ensure 
the interface with the suppliers (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). This is why it seems crucial to 
understand  how  their  firm  controls  them  (objectives  assigned,  evaluation  of  their 
performance…). 
 
The control of the buyer over its suppliers 
Chiapello (1996) organised the literature on organisational modes of control along several 
dimensions: the objects of control, its processes, its moments, the means of control and the 
reactions of the controlled party. Each of theses dimensions respond to a question: What? 
How? When?... However, the dimension “goals of control” (the question Why?) is excluded 
from the typology. This dimension is fundamental because it sheds light on the strategy of the 
one  who  exerts  control  and  gives  sense  to  the  other  dimensions.  In  the  organisational 
literature, three main goals of control can be identified:  
 
-  Ensure goal congruence between the parties: control aims to ensure coherence and 
cohesion between the members of the organisation so that organisational goals are 
achieved.  Scholars  who  have  worked  on  systems  of  coherence  and  coordination 
(Bouquin, 2001; Hopwood, 1974), on integration mechanisms (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967) or on cohesion in organisations (Pech Varguez, 2003) stand by this perspective. 
In inter-organisational literature, authors in the relational exchange view stress as well 








































-  Exert one’s power: the one who controls tries to obtain behaviours from others that 
they would not have had otherwise. With reference to Dahl (1957)’s concept of power, 
Tannenbaum (1962) suggests that control has a symbolic significance since it implies 
the superiority of the one, the inferiority of the other, the criticism of the one, the 
submission of the other… In the inter-organisational literature, to exert one’s power is 
one of the goals of those who stand on the power dependence view. 
 
-  Reduce uncertainty: control aims to ensure that no bad surprise will occur. Merchant 
(1982) supports this perspective. Good control is the insurance that the realisations 
will  match  up  with  the  plans.  In  inter-organisational  literature,  transaction  cost 
theorists  and  resource  dependence  theorists  propose  modes  of  control  that  aim  at 
attaining this goal. 
 
These  three  main  goals  that  are  identified  from  organisational  control  literature  can  be 
compared to those of the three main inter-organisational views. Our organisational conception 
of control allows us to integrate the different views in our conceptual framework and to study 
modes of control that respond to one or several goals according to the empirical situations. 
The modes of control will be analysed according to three dimensions proposed by Chiapello 
(1996):  the  objects  of  control  (results,  working  processes,  behaviours,  strategic  choices), 
means  of  control  (market,  organisation,  individual  interactions)  and  the  reactions  of  the 
controlled party (here the supplier). 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
This research draws from six case studies of French buyer firms. These case studies enabled 
us to consider complex control processes, to describe the organisation of buyer firms and their 
goals. Since these phenomena remain largely unexplored, it seemed judicious to carry out a 
qualitative empirical analysis (Yin, 1989). 
 
Each  of  the  case  studies  that  has  been  chosen  for  this  research  evolves  in  a  purchasing 
environment that can be described in terms of reciprocal dependence between the buyer firm 
and  its  suppliers.  A  preliminary  study  was  conducted  in  an  automobile  equipment 







































0market, submission of the buyer, domination of the buyer) could be distinguished according to 
the reciprocal dependence between the firms. We contacted 13 firms in diverse industrial 
sectors and conducted exploratory interviews with people from each firm. We observed that 
10 of theses firms developed relationships with their suppliers that could be mainly classified 
in one of the four types. According to this type, the organisation of the buyer and the control 
that was exerted over the suppliers seemed different. Among the ten potential cases, three 
firms did not wish to take part in further interviews given the time required by an in-depth 
study. Another firm experienced serious financial difficulties (liquidation), cutting the study 
short.  We  therefore  possess  detailed  data  on  six  cases  from  diverse  industrial  sectors: 
automotive  (Autoplus  and  Consauto),  aeronautics  (Airindustry),  pharmaceutical  (Pharma), 
agrifood (Agri) and telecommunication (Telecom). 
 
For each of the cases, we carried out interviews with the purchasing directors and purchasing 
agents. We questioned them about the environment of buyer-supplier relationships in which 
their firm evolved. We then asked them to choose the supplier they considered to be the most 
representative of their portfolio and asked them to comment on the extent of the asymmetry of 
their dependence and that of the chosen supplier
2. We questioned each purchasing agent on 
his expectations with regard to the selected supplier, assigned goals, modes of monitoring, 
modes of assessment, relational modes, as well as on the reactions and strategies of the 
supplier. We wanted to focus the intervi ew on one particular relationship so as to avoid 
commentary on the management control of suppliers in general. In parallel, we interviewed 
suppliers about the relational modes fostered with the buyer and about the strategies that they 
implement with regard to the buyer. 60 people were interviewed. 
Finally, we consulted and studied internal corporate documents (e.g. supplier follow -up 
spreadsheet,  supplier  assessment  grids,  framework  contracts,  etc.)  and  external  firm 
documents (press reviews, financial statements, etc.). All the data was analyzed according to 
the method recommended by Miles and Huberman (1991). We constructed relevant categories 
from our analysis of the literature and completed them using field data. The data were coded 
using the software NVivo, which enabled us to lay down intra-site, then inter-site, matrices in 
order to draw out patterns of analysis. 
                                                            
2 We adopted the scales validated by Andaleeb (1995), Heide (1994) and Lusch and Brown, (1996). The buyer 
evaluated three items from 1 to 5 (from “do not agree at all” to “completely agree”). We added up the scores to 
obtain an overall score for each variable. We then re-dimensioned this score on a scale of 0 to 20 using the 










































3. CONTROL CONFIGURATIONS IN BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS 
The analysis of the data led us to create a matrix (figure 1) on which cases can be positioned 
according to the two axes that were identified (dependence of the buyer / dependence of the 
supplier).  
The dependence of the buyer was evaluated according to:  
-  the concentration of the potential suppliers 
-  the concentration of the exchanges with the suppliers 
-  technological, industrial and regulations constraints 
 
The dependence of the suppliers was evaluated according to:  
-  the concentration of the buyers 











Figure 1: Position of the cases on the matrix 
 
Four  control  configurations  in  buyer-supplier  relationships  were  identified.  For  each 
configuration, we observed coherence between the purchasing environment of the buyer firm, 
its  purchasing  organisation  (structure  and  intra-organisational  control  of  the  purchasing 



































































03.1. Low interdependence between the buyer and its suppliers: the market configuration 
Figure 2 presents the articulation between the purchasing environment of the buyer firm, its 










Figure 2: Market configuration 
 
3.1.1. Purchasing organisation 
The structure 
A  buyer  is,  overall,  in  a  situation  of  low  dependence  with  its  suppliers  because  it  buys 
standard products that many potentially substitutable suppliers can produce. It has interest to 
centralise its purchase to take advantage of the volume effect and to diminish its cost of 
structure (Gadde and Hakansson, 1993). The purchasing structure of Telecom (which is in a 
market configuration), is actually centralised to the level that is considered to be relevant (the 
zone or the group). 
 
Intra-organisational control of purchasing agents 
The  purchasing  agents  of  Telecom  are  evaluated  on  their  results,  principally  in  terms  of 
economic savings. Their objectives are clear, formalised, and measurable by the information 
system.  The  objectives  are  the  same  for  every  purchasing  agent,  but  the  amount  of  the 
economic  gains  depends  on  the  market  anticipations  concerning  the  different  purchase 
domains.  Another  objective  assigned  to  the  purchasing  agents  concerns  the  logistical 
performance of the suppliers due to uncertainty on the volumes and industrial constraints of 
the  production  units.  Purchasing  agents  have  principally  a  role  of  rationalisation  which 
consists of reducing costs and rationalising the flows (Gadde and Hakansson, 1993). 
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0To obtain these results, the purchasing agents  have to  convince the prescriptors (e.g. the 
engineers of the research units) and the users (e.g. the personnel of the production units) who 
are their internal client that their choices are relevant. As a result, the purchasing director 
requires the purchasing agents to adopt certain behaviours (communication, listening of the 
needs) toward the other internal  actors so  that they integrate into their global purchasing 
policy some local preoccupations. 
 
3.1.2. Control over the suppliers 
Taken into account the low interdependence relationship between the buyer and its suppliers, 
the  buyer  Telecom  tries  to  grasp  any  opportunity  on  the  market
3  at  any  time .  The 
characteristics of  market control  have already  been described in the literature (Langfield -
Smith and Smith, Van der Meer -Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000):  periodical competitive 
biddings,  no  detailed  contracting,  payment  based  on  standardised  activities  or  output . 
However, our study suggests that organising regular competitive biddings does not mean that 
the buyer will change from  one supplier to another . Threats  of production transfer are 
certainly frequent during the negotiations, mainly for economic reasons, but the putting into 
practise of these threats seems to be rare. Even when the transfer is possible, the other actors 
in the buyer firm (prescriptors, users) prefer continuity to rupture of the relationship and they 
resist the change of suppliers. 
 
3.2. Low dependence of the buyer, high dependence of the suppliers: the lordship 
configuration 
Figure 3 presents the articulation between the purchasing environment of the buyer firm, its 
organisation and the control it exerts over its suppliers in the lordship configuration. 
                                                            
3 This goal did not appear in the goals of control identified from organisational control works. It stemmed back 
















































Figure 3: Lordship configuration 
 
3.1.1. Purchasing organisation 
The structure 
The  purchasing  structure  of  Agri  (which  stands  in  the  lordship  configuration)  is,  as 
Telecom’s, centralised to the “relevant” level (the geographical zone or the group) so that it 
can take advantage of the volume effect and diminish its cost structure.  
 
Intra-organisational control of purchasing agents 
The purchasing agents of Agri are evaluated on their results, principally in terms of economic 
savings. Their objectives are clear, formalised, and measurable by the information system. 
However,  the  purchasing  agents  cannot  achieve  these  results  alone.  They  need  that 
prescriptors (marketing, R&D) to simplify their product and that the users (production units) 
agree on changing their suppliers if necessary. As a result, the purchasing agents are also 
evaluated on their ability to communicate within the group, to convince the others of the 
relevancy and to create an internal network.  
 
3.1.2. Control over the suppliers 
In light of its favourable position of asymmetrical dependence, Agri seeks to exert its power 
over its suppliers to get the most out of exchange, in a way similar to a lord exercising his 
rights over his vassals. This behaviour is consistent with the analyses of Dwyer and Walker 
(1981), Kale (1986), and Provan and Skinner (1989) within the power and dependence view 
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0and coincides with the postulates of the transactional view: he who holds the power does not 
hesitate to exploit the relationship and show himself to be opportunistic. 
The  exercise  of  power  implies  a  formal  control  on  the  results  (price,  quality,  on-time 
delivery),  on  working  processes,  on  behaviours,  and  on  strategic  choices.  Two  modes  of 
control are developed in tandem: recourse to the market and organisational control. On the 
one hand, market is a means to ensure the lowest price (e.g. inverse auctions on the Internet). 
On the other hand, organisational devices are also developed. Agri regularly redefines goals in 
terms of price, quality, delivery conditions, and volumes. It also expects suppliers to develop 
a strategy (in terms of innovation, of production organisation, etc.) in step with its demands 
and  imposes  compliance  with  relational  norms  in  its  favour  (providing  services,  being 
proactive in seeking new sources of productivity, showing flexibility, being totally transparent 
on the breakdown of costs, etc.).  In parallel  to  the classic process  of control  (objectives, 
monitoring, assessment/sanction), Agri is developing a strategy of encroaching its suppliers. It 
is ensuring that it is treated as a favoured buyer by performing follow-up audits and spot-
checks at supplier sites. These devices aim to verify in situ the truthfulness of information 
provided  by  commercial  counterparts  (notably  information  regarding  the  breakdown  of 
supplier costs, the market shares of different buyers, etc.) and to monitor competition. Agri’s 
encroachment is limited only by its cost (mainly in terms of human resources) compared to 
the benefits that it may draw from the process.  
Agri’s  suppliers,  having  few  action  levers  over  their  buyer,  are  also  developing  active 
strategies  to  encroach  on  production  units  (by  being  present  with  operators,  workshop 
supervisors, and directors) in order to develop a network of relationships and favour Agri’s 
relational competencies. They apply themselves to responding as best they can to the concerns 
of production units while trying to glean information on potential competitors and on new 
projects for which they could position themselves. Moreover, they emphasize their relational 
behaviour to foster the buyer’s benevolence; they communicate intensively and try to develop 
good personal relationships with the different Agri counterparts. This supplier strategy of 
influence is in step with research findings stemming from the relational exchange view: the 
more individuals communicate, the more trust and relational norms develop, which, in fine, 
fosters cooperation in the long term and discourages the buyer from threatening its supplier or 
switching production to other suppliers (Boyle et al., 1992; Joshi and Arnold, 1997; Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994). However, our observations go further, suggesting that the affective influence 
of suppliers results from pure calculation on their part. Where the authors of the relational 







































0cooperation, and in particular of goodwill trust, we observe, on the contrary, that relational 
strategies stem from a marked intention that goes far beyond goodwill trust. 
 
 
3.3. High interdependence between the buyer and its suppliers: the parnership 
configuration 
Figure 4 presents the articulation between the purchasing environment of the buyer firm, its 











Figure 4: Partnership configuration 
 
3.3.1. Purchasing organisation 
The structure 
A buyer is, overall, dependent on its supplier because its demands are to specific to have 
many potential suppliers (due to the technology of the products, of the processes, due to the 
required production capacity or international implantation, etc.). A decentralised structure is 
coherent with this complex type of purchase that is usually specific to a project (or to a 
business unit). In Consauto and Autoplus (which stand in this partnership configuration), the 
purchasing structure is effectively decentralised: local purchasing agents are very close to the 
research units for each project cell. However, to exploit similarities between the projects and 
to take advantage of the volume effect, the purchasing structure is also centralised. Some 
global purchasing agents are in charge of suppliers in their domain for the whole firm. This 
double  structural  characteristic  (centralisation  /  decentralisation)  implies  in  both  cases  a 
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Coordinate interdependent activities
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0matrix  structure.  Moreover,  to  better  control  their  suppliers  on  different  aspects  (quality 
process, cost reductions…), Consauto and Autoplus reinforced this matrix structure with some 
experts (or support functions) from the purchasing department or those that are detached from 
other departments to audit the suppliers. 
 
Intra-organisational control of purchasing agents 
In  both  cases,  local  purchasing  agents  are  responsible  for  the  operational  control  of  the 
suppliers. They are asked to implement the monitoring of the risks in the project phase and the 
monitoring  of  the  results  (on-time  delivery,  quality  results,  and  price  reductions)  in  the 
production phase. Global purchasing agents are required to obtain price and cost reductions 
and to ensure the quality of the supply. However, the purchasing agents who are evaluated on 
the economic results (cost reductions) could be tempted to obtain great price reductions in the 
short  term  by  favouring  very  coercive  strategies  (threatens,  sanctions)  over  dependent 
suppliers,  without  taking  into  account  the  dependence  of  the  buyer  in  the  long  term.  To 
prevent from this risk, the purchasing agents are required by internal directives (in Consauto 
and  Autoplus)  to  behave  positively  (to  be  honest,  ethical,  to  respect  their  obligations)  to 
limit/reduce  risk  of  their  suppliers.  Additionally,  close  attention  seems  to  be  paid  to  any 
negative information that come from suppliers (complaints, discontents, …).  
 
3.3.2. Control over the suppliers 
In a partnership configuration, the buyer aims to ensure goal congruence with its suppliers. 
This goal includes the search for coherence as well as the willingness to create a certain 
degree of cohesion between the teams. 
In the selection phase, the buyer exerts an enlarged bureaucratic control over its suppliers on 
its  capacity,  on  its  performance  about  quality,  logistics,  industrialisation,  international 
implantation,  innovation,  strategic  choices.  The  experiences  of  the  relationships  and  the 
reputation  of  the  suppliers  are  taken  into  account.  Selection  mechanisms  (e.g.  numerous 
audits, evaluation of strategic choices, of the financial health) allow the buyer to better know 
its  suppliers,  to  be  sure  that  it  has  appropriate  attitudes  (in  terms  of  quality  approach, 
production capacity, innovation capacity, etc.) which is, according to Dekker (2004) a means 
to reduce problems of control and to instill confidence. Selection mechanisms appear in fact 
to favour ex ante coherence between the firms. However, the selection of the suppliers is not a 







































0between the actors (e.g. between the purchasing agents, the engineers, the project directors) 
who seem to favour one criterion or another to influence the decision. 
During the cooperation, the devices that are designed by the buyer to control its partner are 
numerous and complex. They are implemented by the different actors of the buyer firm (local, 
global purchasing agents, experts…). Theses devices are certainly costly for the buyer firm 
(mainly  in  term  of  human  resources)  but  they  may  generate  direct  savings  (for  example 
productivity savings gained from the various audits) and indirect benefits (better informal 
knowledge of the supplier). The implementation of theses devices gives the different actors of 
the buyer firms the opportunity to glean information on the strategy, on the real capacity of 
the supplier, etc. Moreover, we observed between the project teams relationships relational 
norms (mainly solidarity, information sharing) and trust-based relationships, which does not 
exclude conflicts. This confidence atmosphere that stems from the complementarity between 
formal and informal control seems to favour in fine the inter-organisational cohesion.  
 
3.4. High dependence of the buyer, low dependence of the suppliers: the vassalage 
configuration 
Figure 5 presents the articulation between the purchasing environment of the buyer firm, its 










Figure 5: Vassalage configuration 
3.4.1. Purchasing organisation 
The structure 
As seen before, a decentralised structure is consistent with complex types of purchase (due to 
the technology of the production, of the processes, etc.), which implies for the buyer to be 
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0dependent on its supplier. This analysis is confirmed by the cases Airindustry and Pharma. 
However, the parallel centralisation that leads to a matrix structure has not been observed 
because global synergies between the different business units are considered to be too limited.  
 
Intra-organisational control of purchasing agents 
In  the  vassalage  configuration,  purchasing  agents’  performance  is  not  assessed  by  the 
economic  savings.  These  are,  anyway,  limited  since  dominant  suppliers  do  not  accept 
decreases in their prices. The purchasing directors’ main request from their subordinates is to 
achieve operational results:  
-  to  ensure  the  security  (in  terms  of  quality  and  regularity)  of  the  supply  of  the 
production units; 
-  to develop purchasing methods (to design and implement indicators and devices to 
monitor  the  performance  of  the  suppliers,  to  develop  internal  reporting,  to  create 
“decision making aids” ) 
-  to get involved upstream during the development stage phase at the engineers’ side. 
 
3.4.2. Control over the suppliers 
In light of their unfavourable position of asymmetrical dependence, vassal buyers seek to 
reduce their uncertainty concerning the quality and the continuity of the supplying by trying 
to  structure  their  exchanges  through  contracts.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the 
propositions of the dependence resource theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and those of the 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985) in situations of high dependency. The suppliers, 
however, only accept the contracts required by regulation. They reject any mode of incentive, 
monitoring or sanctioning through contract (no late-delivery penalties or commitments on 
price...). Airindustry and Pharma have also failed to develop behavioural control (for instance, 
through  auditing  processes)  as  recommended  by  agency  theory  whenever  the  product  is 
complex and uncertainty high. Suppliers refuse all on-site spot checks and other forms of 
observation that they consider to be intrusive. The only controllable and acceptable elements 
for suppliers remain the respect of quality and delivery deadlines since these are considered 
“health factors” of cooperation. To compensate for the lack of formal supplier control tools, 
Airindustry and Pharma rely on more informal mechanisms. They are seeking to develop 
good, sometimes even friendly, personal relationships with their counterparts by multiplying 







































0cooperation. By doing so, they create the conditions of “affective trust” (Jeffries and Reed, 
2000; McAllister, 1995). Thanks to this relational strategy, buyers are attempting to favour 
suppliers’ commitment, ensure a certain flexibility and continuity of supply, as well as obtain 
exclusive information on new products, competitors, and even sometimes cost structures.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this research, we have attempted to study the control that buyers exert over their suppliers 
according  to  the  characteristics  of  the  purchasing  environment  of  the  buyer.  Four 
configurations  have  been  identified.  For  each  one,  the  buyer  organisation  (in  terms  of 
structure  and  intra-organisational  control  of  purchasing  agents)  and  the  control  over  the 
suppliers  are consistent  with  the purchasing  environment  of the buyer firm.  The Table 2 
presents a synthesis of the results.  
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-  Internal 
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methods 
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To grasp the 
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market 
To exert its 
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Table 2: buyer-supplier control configurations 
For each configuration, a principal goal for the buyer firm has been identified and gives sense 
to the modes of control that are designed and implemented: the lord buyer aims to exert its 
power; the partner buyer seeks to ensure goal congruence with its supplier; the vassal buyer 
tries to reduce its uncertainty; and the market buyer aims to grasp any opportunity on the 
market. This latter goal did not appear in the initial typology of control goals. It is particularly 
adapted to the outsourcing context since it implies market control. It may also be relevant in 







































0the SWOT devices, the balanced scorecard) although the theorists in organisational control do 
not explicitly express it. In this perspective, the control system can be considered as an alert 
system which is turned to outside (i.e. the environment) and not to inside (i.e. the internal 
organisation) so that managers be able to grasp the best opportunity of their environment. 
 
Moreover, by studying the organisation of the buyer firms, we observed that many internal 
actors are concerned with buyer-supplier relationships. The interests of these actors are not 
necessarily converging: purchasing agents are often interested in prices (according to their 
objectives),  prescriptors  (development  engineers)  seem  to  lay  stress  on  technology  and 
personnel in production units prefer to ensure the quality of the supply. Thus, a transfer of 
production that would be economically relevant can be hindered because the engineers or the 
personnel of the production units refuse it. As a result, the strategy of the suppliers is to cosy 
up the different  department of the buyer firm.  They create the conditions  of an affective 
influence on these actors. To better understand this form of supplier control over buyers and 
the complexity of the internal coordination in buyer firms, it could be interesting to deepen 
the study of buyer organisations. Similar research could also be conducted on supplier firms.  
 
Finally, we based our methodology on case studies in order to analyze a phenomenon that 
remains  mostly  unexplored.  This  choice  entails  the  limitation  of  having  findings  that  are 
singular and cannot be generalized. We envisage putting these initial findings (or a part of 
these findings) to the test on a broader population. 
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i A specific asset is an asset that cannot be redeployed to alternative use without sacrifice of productive value. 
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